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IF MEN WERE ANGELS. By Jerome Frank. New York: Harper and Brothers,
1942, pp. vii, 380.
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A depen-
dence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."'
The traditional fear of government abuse of the sovereign power, basic in
the conventional American political philosophy, is generally expressed in the
demand for "a government of laws and not of men."2 The many and various
meanings attributed to that phrase have left unimpaired the fundamental con-
cept identified thereby, that the ultimate security of the people against tyranny
of government lies in the imposition and maintenance of pre-determined and
precisely defined legal limitations or restraints upon the exercise of govern-
mental power. The relatively simple social organization in operation at the
end of the eighteenth century did not require any greater governmental control
or regulation than even a strict interpretation of the Federal Constitution would
permit. But the modern industrial civilization and the complexity of social
problems it has engendered have so broadened the necessary scope of govern-
ment function and so loosened the bond of restraint upon government power
that the ancient securities against government despotism require re-evaluation.
In this his latest essay on government and law,3 If Men Were Angels,
Judge Jerome Frank has undertaken a restatement of the principle of govern-
ment limitation in general, and a defense of the contemporary system of admin-
istrative government in the light thereof, in face of mounting criticisms that the
government of the United States is no longer "a government of laws, and not
of men." The latter phrase, states the author, whatever its various connota-
tions, discloses fundamentally "a desire to avoid, as far as practicable, the
intrusion of the 'personal' element in government. It means that government
officers are the public's servants, and must not follow their own caprices." 4 Or,
in other words, it is, ultimately, the public will which constitutes the effective
limitation upon the exercise of government powers. "But we dare not push the
literal meaning of that (quoted) phrase too far. If we do, we lose sight of the'
fact that government, too, must, unavoidably, be administered by human beings.
Government is not and cannot be made into a piece of automatic machinery." 5
Indeed, continues the author, the emphasis upon the mechanical aspects of gov-
ernment tends to obscure the need for honest, diligent and competent adminis-
trators. "The thorough awareness that there is an unavoidable personal factor
'THE FEDERALIST, No. 51. Quoted, FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS, pp.
vii, 9.
2 Judge Frank devotes a chapter (XII) to "The Historic Meaning of a
'Government of Laws'."
3 Earlier works by the author: LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) ; SAVE
AMERICA FIRST (1938).
4P. 1.
5 P. 2.
BOOK REVIEWS
in government is the best way to reduce to a minimum the bad effects of that
personal factor."6 We must avoid the extremes: "to insist that we can have a
pure 'government of laws' . . .is likely to lead to concealed, and, therefore,
corrupt or tyrannical 'personal government.'.. to insist, that if we have a gov-
ernment made up of 'good men', we need not bother about legal restraints on
their activities, is to insure unconcealed 'personal government'--dictatorship.
What we, in a democracy, must insist upon is a government of laws well admin-
istered by the right kind of men."7
With this introduction, Judge Frank proceeds to argue that the essential,
truly reliable, safeguards against despotic government are present in the current
administration of the Federal Government, viz., a personnel of highly competent
public officials sensitive and responsive to the demands of the public. "To the
freedoms inherent in a real democracy most of the men in our national govern-
ment are devoted. And that signifies that they are devoted to those efficiencies
which go with such a democracy. And when they say that they want our
democratic government to be made up of decent, honest, God-fearing men to
whom absolutism is nauseating, they are surely not to be charged with a secret
or open hankering for 'personal government' or with advocacy of the autocracy
of the Nazis or Fascists. Yet many of them have recently been denigrated in
just that way."s At this point the foregoing discussion of political ideology
degenerates into the author's particular theme-the defense of the administrative
government-for, he continues, "And such charges have, with particular vehem-
ence, been leveled at the members of the federal commissions and so-called
administrative agencies.
After a brief summary of the necessities for an administrative branch of
government and a statement of the advantages of the administrative system,
quoted at length from a report on "Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies" by an Attorney-General's committee, Judge Frank engages in a one-
sided debate with the critics of the New Deal administrative agencies. The
author has selected as his opponent Dean Roscoe Pound because, as he asserts:
"To answer Pound ... is to answer virtually all the critics of those agencies,
for his comments are typical." However, whereas most of the comments by
Dean Pound, referred to by the author, are directed toward the methods and
aim of the present administrative government in general, Judge Frank limits his
rebuttal primarily to a defense of the Securities and Exchange Commission of
which he was formerly chairman.
With the advantages the author has thus taken to himself, he is extra-
ordinarily effective in his refutation of the "critics". He proves, inter alia,
that the governing rules of SEC proceedings are readily accessible; that state-
ments of the issues, the evidence, the findings of fact are made in proceedings
before that commission; that contested hearings are conducted in public; that
decisions therein are published, and that these do form precedents guiding the
commission's future adjudications. He refers to the limitations on the discre-
tionary power of administrative boards imposed by the statutes governing them,
6 P. 5.
7 P. 9.
8 P. 13.
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to the opportunity for judicial review of their decisions, and to the conscien-
tiousness and competence of administrative personnel and their devotion to the
cause of democracy, as proof that the derogatory phrase "administrative abso-
lutism" is a vituperative characterization that is not consonant with the facts,
and is, indeed, employed by the critics of administrative government to conceal
their ignorance of the realities.
The author's argumentation is excellently detailed. He leaves no room,
within the relatively narrow issues he has framed, for an effective surrebutal,
and is therefore, under the circumstances, exceedingly persuasive. When Dean
Pound, according to Judge Frank, intimates that administrative boards are
under the influence or "juristic realists"-"who entertain ideas subversive of the
fundamentals of American democracy," " the author undertakes an extensive
analysis of Realist Jurisprudence; identifies the known "juristic realists"; indi-
cates they are not a homogeneous group espousing a common political or eco-
nomic philosophy; and that, moreover, only two of them have ever been mem-
bers of any federal administrative agency. If administrative procedure mani-
fests the realist influence, it does so in the technique by which administrative
tribunals determine the facts of cases brought before them.
The author devotes three chapters to the importance of the facts in the
administration of law. Whatever the divergent concepts provoked by the
term,"' "Law" as a reality is measured by its application to facts. Judicial
decisions are the product of two factors: the legal precepts and the facts to
which they are applied. However precisely formulated the legal precepts, the
"correctness" of the decision depends upon the accuracy with which the facts
are determined. From the fallibility of witnesses, the partisanship of counsel,
the inexperience of jurors, to the confusing technicalities of jury charges and
the deception of the "general verdict", the author details the pitfalls to an
accurate determination of the facts in the conventional court trial.
Administrative tribunals "are at least as mindful as the courts of the inher-
ent difficulties of fact finding in cases where the testimony is in conflict," 11 but
they "have made distinct contributions to trial procedure which move in the
direction of improved accuracy in ascertaining the actual facts of cases." 12
An administrative commission, such as the SEC, need not rely on the compe-
tence and ethics of counsel to produce the true facts. It employs a trained staff
of investigators, accountants, analysts, engineers, and other specialists to pro-
cure evidence that may be offered at the trial, subject, of course, to cross-
examination and the usual objections as to competence and relevancy.13 Fur-
thermore, because of their specialized experience, the commissioners, themselves,
are more proficient in the task of comprehending the facts and drawing the
proper inferences, than the common lay jury. Finally, the commission will
ordinarily not take refuge in a general verdict but will render findings of fact
which, as part of the record, may then be subject to judicial review. "The
9 P. 54.
10 Judge Frank has forsworn the use of the word "law" whenever possible,
pp. 56, 66.
11 p. 121.
12 P. 122.
is Ibid.
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administrative agencies, by coming closer than the courts to the actual facts of
the cases before them, are coming closer to deciding cases justly." 14 But "the
antithesis between courts and commissions should not be too sharply drawn",
admonishes the author.1 5 Adjudication and administration are still separable
functions. "As dispute-deciding is a function of fundamental importance, it
would be a misfortune if its dispatch were impeded by adding to the duties of
the judges extensive administrative and regulatory duties of the sort which
administrative bodies are now designed to perform." 16 On the other hand, the
efficiency of the administrative process would be seriously impaired were it
saddled with all the traditions and technique of the courts.
The doctrine of "separation of powers" finds a corollary in the tradition
that the same officer must not be both prosecutor and judge. Administrative
commissions do, of course, enact rules, prosecute violations thereof and adjudi-
cate the issues therewith arising. The classical three powers of government
are thus vested in a single agency. To the protest that such a combination of
powers leads inevitably to despotism, the author counters with an historical and
critical analysis of the doctrine of separation of powers to establish that the
doctrine has never required, and cannot accomplish, a "water-tight" compart-
mentation of government or the exclusive allocation of these powers to separate
offices. The pressing problems of contemporary society require solutions by
government action possible only through a fusion of government powers. The
concentration of such powers in administrative agencies, asserts the author, is
neither without precedent nor contrary to the Federal Constitution. The inhi-
bitions on the unlawful usurpation of government still inhere in the system of
"checks and balances" maintained by the Constitution. Ultimately, and here
again is expressed Judge Frank's main theme, "Legal formalities cannot prevent
abuse of government powers." 17 "Here, as elsewhere, in the last analysis, the
protection of the citizen from misuse of government power must be found in
the selection of officers ...who are honest, well-trained, intelligent, conscien-
tious; imbued with the love of liberty; controlled not only by the ethical atti-
tudes of the community, but by self-discipline ... ." 1s
In this essay the author has produced neither a text on the federal adminis-
trative system nor a treatise on political philosophy. He has merely undertaken
a defense of the administrative government against criticisms of its merits and
of its conformity with American political ideals. Those who doubt the effi-
ciency of administrative government have been convincingly answered. If there
be any who protest that an administrative department of government violates
the doctrine of separation of powers, that the operation of administrative agen-
cies is unconstitutional, or that the government must and can be solely "a gov-
ernment of laws", they have been thoroughly refuted. These issues the author
has successfully met. As a judge upon them the reader must render a verdict
in his favor. But an uncomfortable feeling may persist that the facts upon
14 P. 127.
15 Ibid.
16 P. 139
17 P. 330.
18 P. 331.
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which such judgment will be based are "courtroom facts" and not the para-
mount realities.
However true it may be that the mere formalities of legal restraints upon
government will not thwart a dictatorship, it remains equally obvious that a
reliance upon the political integrity and administrative competence of govern-
ment personnel will not insure the liberties of democracy. Granted that a
dependence on the people is a primary control, experience still teaches mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions against demagoguery. Conceding that a
compromise of the extremes is to be sought and maintained, the emphasis of the
stricture is still upon the "government of laws". One cannot resist the impres-
sion that Judge Frank has misplaced that emphasis. It is to be expected that
the disciples of a new order will in their struggles against the restrictions of
tradition exaggerate the inefficiencies of the past and minimize the vices of the
future. But it is in the very enthusiasm of the creation of a new order that
the threat to the virtues of the past and the danger of inefficiencies in the future
are born. The demand for a flexible government responsive to the will of the
people must never displace the demand for a stable government responsive to
the principles of constitutional limitations.
Of course,-"If men were angels . . ."
G. ROBERT ELLEGAARD.*
FEDERAL INcOME GIFT AND EsTATE TAXATION. By Rabkin and Johnson. Al-
bany: Matthew Bender & Co., 1942, pp. i-vi, 1-28, 1014130.
Here is a fresh approach to the study of federal taxation from the point of
view of the lawyer. It is comparable to the "Hornbook Series" of texts long
available to lawyers and law students in other fields of law. The book invites
comparison with the current tax services, Montgomery's Handbooks and Paul
and Merten's authoritative treatment of the Law of Federal Income Taxation
in six volumes and a 1939 voluminous supplement' of over 3100 pages. The
authors have succeeded amply in satisfying the need for just such a book for
lawyers and tax practitioners.
The book reads like a collection of studies on all aspects of the tax law
and the material is arranged so that each chapter is given a unified treatment of
the particular subject matter instead of the patchwork, all-inclusive material
found in the tax services. As a matter of fact the chapter on Partnerships was
the basis of a law review article that was published in the April, 1942 issue of
the Harvard Law Review. Other chapters in the book could quite readily be
similarly presented separately as scholarly studies of the particular subject
matter involved.
The arrangement of the material is novel yet orderly, and not bizarre. The
first group of chapters is concerned with Tax Patterns and the five chapters
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 A revision of this work by Mertens has been announced for current
publication.
